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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., a corporation, as Executor of 
the ESTATE OF JAMES C. DEMI-
RIS, Deceased, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
IPHEGENEA, P. DEMIRIS, 
Defendant and Respondent . 
. MARGARETA DEMIRIS PAPACAS-
TAS, CONSTANTINO C. DEMI-
RIS, A THANASIOS DEMIRIS, 
PETER DEMIRIS and JOHN DEMI-
RIS, Intervenors and Appellants. 
Case No. 
8982 
BRIEF OF APPELL~TS 
INTRODUCTION 
This case was an Equity case tried without a jury before 
the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge of the Third Judicial 
District Court in September of 1958. The plaintiff, the executor 
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of the Estate of James C. Demiris, deceased, and the inter-
venors, brothers and sisters of said decedent and beneficiaries 
under his Will, joined together in asserting two causes of 
action against the defendant widow. 
James C. Demiris died childless and testate at the age 
of 74 years on January 23, 1957 in St. Mark's Hospital, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. He had been committed to the hospital on 
December 21, 1956 in an incompetent state resulting from 
acute senile dementia. Between the time he was committed and 
his death, approximately one month later, his widow, the de-
fendant, withdrew the sum of $73,046.44 from eight joint 
bank accounts and cashed U. S. Savings Bonds having a value 
of $9700.00. This total amount of $82,746.44 reduced to pos-
session by the widow just prior to her husband's demise repre-
sented substantially all of the estate created by her husband 
during his lifetime, except for an interest in a note and mort-
gage being collected by the First Security Bank, having a 
value of approximately $16,000.00. Four of the bank accounts 
involved, with sums totalling $38,404.45, were changed from 
the name of James C. Demiris alone to joint accounts with 
his wife on December 5, 1956, 16 days prior to his hospitali-
zation; while the other four accounts had been established 
initially as joint acounts some years before. 
Under the terms of the Will of James C. Demiris ad-
mitted to probate, each of his four brothers and his sister, the 
intervenors in this case, all of whom survived him, was to 
receive bequests of $10,000.00 each and the balance of his 
estate was to go to his wife, the defendant. In addition the 
deceased had a life insurance policy of $10,000.00 with his 
wife as the beneficiary. 
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The first cause of action was to recover from the defendant 
the sum of $38,404.45, the amount obtained by her from 
the four accounts that were made joint on December 5, 1956. 
It was claimed that at the time the accounts were changed on 
December 5th that James Demiris was mentally incompetent 
and that the defendant exercised undue influence over him so 
that the opening of the joint accounts was ineffective and null 
and void, and the funds contained therein were properly a 
part of the decedent's estate. 
The second cause of action sought to recover the amount 
of $82,746.74, the total of the eight bank accounts, including 
the four accounts in the first cause of action and the U. S. 
Savings Bonds having a value of $9700.00 which the defendant 
reduced to possession by withdrawing the accounts and cashing 
the bonds after her husband had been hospitalized in an in-
competent state on December 21, 1956 and prior to his death 
on January 23, 1957. It was contended that the funds were 
the sole property of her husband, that no valid gift thereof 
had been made to her in his lifetime and that by reason of this 
conduct she held the monies in trust for the use and benefit 
of her husband, and after his death for his estate. The de-
fendant answered that her husband was competent on December 
5, 1956; that she had exercised no undue influence over him 
and that all of the sums obtained by her totalling $82,746.74 
was her property. She also asserted a counterclaim against 
the plaintiff executor for the sum of $16,000.00 which was 
the value of the interest owned by her deceased husband in 
the said note and mortgage being collected by the executor 
bank and which the bank is administering in her husband's 
estate pursuant to the terms of his will. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The deceased, James C. Demiris, was born in a small town 
in Greece, the eldest child in a family of six children. He emi-
grated to this country in 1902 at the age of 19 years. The 
other five Demiris children were born after Jim at two-year 
intervals and were John, Peter, Gus, Tom and Margaret, the 
Intervenors in this case (T-121, 122). Peter joined Jim in 
America in 1906 at the age of 18 and John followed in 1907 
(T-122). The brothers located in Salt Lake City and for a 
time ran a herd of dairy cows. Jim began in the hotel business, 
his .life work, in 1908, when he acquired the Albany Hotel. 
The brothers had a very close relationship and worked together,· 
pooling their resources. According to the custom of their 
native land, Jim, the eldest, was the head of the family and 
as such, handled all of the money and business affairs (T-123, 
124). Jim sold the Albany Hotel in 1910 and built the Pacific 
Hotel. John and Peter worked intermittently for Jim at both 
the Albany and Pacific Hotels and held certain other jobs for 
a number of years until they acquired their own businesses 
and were married. During this period they turned their earn-
ings over to Jim, who handled the family finances (T-125), 
and forwarded what could be spared back to their family in 
Greece. In 1923 the three brothers together built the Oakwood 
Apartments at the corner of 6th South and 5th East in Salt 
Lake City. Jim Demiris owned 263/400 interest therein, and 
Peter and John owned the balance equally (T-126, 184, 185) 
(Ex. 1, 2, & 3). 
Jim remained single until 1925 when, at the age of 42 
years, he returned to Greece and married the defendant. After 
the marriage in Athens, Jim and the defendant came back to 
4 
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Salt Lake to live. In 1928 the defendant went back to Greece 
on a visit and remained there about three years. She again 
went back to Greece in 1935 and remained until 1946 (T. 168, 
186). Thus, while Jim and the defendant were married some 
31 years, they were separated approximately 13 years of this 
time. Jim made most of his money during the war years at 
the Pacific Hotel while Mrs. Demiris was in Greece (T-127). 
He sold this hotel in 1948 and the following year the three 
brothers sold the Oakwood Apartments. Jim retired from 
active business after the sale of the apartments in 1949 (T-186, 
187) .. 
Soon after they were married Jim and the defendant 
began having marital difficulties. The main source of trouble 
was the defendant's insistence that Jim sell his holdings and 
return to Greece to live (T-129, 142, 187). In 1951 the 
marital trouble became so bad that both Jim and the defendant 
consulted attorneys about a divorce. At this period they 
separated for approximately one month's time, and during 
this separation Jim had Mr. E. R. Callister, Jr., his attorney, 
offer the defendant $10,000.00 if she would divorce him 
(T-106, 107). 
In 1952, following the death of the defendant's mother 
in Greece, Jim and the defendant went there for a visit for 
several months. On March 19, 1952, prior to departing for 
Greece, Jim had Mr. Callister prepare a will that left specific 
bequests of $5,000.00 each to his four brothers and his sister 
and the balance to his wife (Ex. P-4). On March 25, 1952 
Jim returned to Mr. Callister's office with the defendant and 
told him that he wanted a new will which was then prepared, 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
leaving $1,000.00 only to each of the two brothers and one 
sister in Greece and nothing to the brothers, John and Peter 
in America, and the balance to his wife, with the provision 
that if the defendant predecease him that one-half of his 
estate go to her family and one-half to his family (T-102, 
103, 104) (Ex. P-5). The next day, March 26, 1952 Jim returned 
to l\fr. Callister's office alone and said that he had made the 
Will the day before only to appease his wife and it was not 
what he wanted at all (T-105). He told Mr. Callister that 
he was concerned about his wife getting all his money, that 
he wanted his brothers and sister to share in his estate and 
that he did not want her family to participate at all (T-109). 
He thereupon instructed Mr. Callister to prepare the Will that 
was admitted to probate which left $10,000.00 to each of his 
four brothers and a sister and the balance to his wife (Ex. P-6). 
Upon their return from Greece in 1952 they moved back 
into the Oakwood Apartments. The marital troubles continued. 
Some of the other tenants in the Apartments reported that 
they could hear violent quarrels and fights frequently (T-149). 
On one such occasion a tenant called the police (T-290). 
During these fights, which usually occurred at night, Mrs. 
Demiris' shouts and cries could be heard throughout the 
apartment (T-149, 177, 289). Jim told a number of his 
friends of his troubles with his wife and the unhappiness 
which she caused him, patricularly in 1956, the last year of 
his life. John Condas, a friend for 45 years, reported that in 
the late summer of 1956 Jim told him of the troubles he was 
having with his wife and that she was constantly hollering 
at him to return to Greece (T-118). John Pragastis, another 
close friend, also heard from Jim during 1956 of his marital 
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troubles and Jim told him that the only solution was divorce 
(T-142). 
Ted Jouflas knew Jim and the defendant only slightly. 
In the summer of 1956 he saw them on the corner of 3rd 
South and Main Street. His attention was drawn to them 
because they were speaking in Greek and the defendant was 
using very profane language (T-160, 161). They were arguing 
about money and she said to her husband that he didn't have 
long to live and when he died she would get all of his money 
(T-162). Mrs. Frank Vlcek, a neighbor and friend of the 
Demirises in the Oakwood Apartments, asked the defendant 
about a bruise on her arm in the summer of 1956. The de-
fendant told her that Jim had caused the bruise in a fight over 
money and that she had offered to leave him if he would giv,. 
her $60,000.00 (T-150). Mrs. Vlcek said that the arguments 
which the Demirises had had throughout her stay in the 
Oakwod Apartments continued unabated throughout the late 
fall of 1956 (T-151). Mr. Alke T. Diamant, an attorney in 
Sailt Lake City, had known Jim Demiris for 25 years. Between 
July and early November in 1956 he saw Jim on several occa-
sions on the street and twice in his law office where Jim came 
for consultation (T-153). Jim told Mr. Diamant of his marital 
troubles and asked how much he would have to pay his wife 
in order to obtain a divorce from her. Jim said that he would 
pay as much as $40,000.00 to get rid of her (T-154). Jim 
told Mr. Diamant that Mr. Callister had prepared a will for 
him which he wished checked to be sure that his brothers and 
sister would share in his estate when he died. He said that 
he disliked his wife's family very much and feared that they 
might poison him for his money ( T -15 5) . 
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In the late summer and fall of 1956 the relatives and close 
friends of Jim Demiris noticed a gradual change in him. He 
became nervous and unable to sit for long without pacing 
around ( T -118) . He became quiet and uncommunicative 
where before he used to talk a lot about business affairs and 
politics with his old friends (T-131). In September his memory 
began to slip (T-131). He became forgetful (T-178) and 
absent-minded (T-143). He became less active and stopped 
going out as much as before (T-178). His friend, John 
Pragastis, said that in the fall of 1956 Jim seemed different, 
almost as though he was broken in spirit (T-143). October 
26, 1956 was Jim's name day and according to the Greek 
custom his friends and relatives visited him at his apartment. 
They testified that Jim had nothing to say and hid behind 
his paper during their visit (T-145, 169). 
Jim's brother, John, had been closer to him through the 
years than anyone else. After Jim's retirement in 1949 he used 
to visit John's grocery store on 8th South and 6th East nearly 
every day and sometimes twice a day (T-188). Because of 
this close association, John was one of the first to observe 
the changes coming over his brother. In September of 1956, 
he noticed Jim's memory "start to get bad" (T-188), and 
Jim commenced to repeat himself (T-189). Jim had been able 
to speak, read, and write the English language quite well 
( T -134) and had been particularly adept with figures. In 
September, Jim was unable to figure the dividends due him 
on his insurance policy so that John had to help him (T-197). 
In October of 1956 John sold his grocery store and retired. 
However, he continued to see Jim almost every day. He noticed 
that Jim seemed to be getting worse and in addition to his 
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memory slipping he seemed very tired and complained about 
his health, particularly about his feet (T-192). 
Alke Diamant also noticed the changes in Jim and said 
that when he saw Jim for the last time in early November, 
Jim seemed to be under tremendous strain (T -158). On 
November 9 John and Jim agreed to send some money to their 
sister Margaret, who was ill in Greece. Jim was unable to 
write anything to her in their letter (T -191). He got worse 
in November and on the 26th, while John was in town with 
him, Jim acted very strange and couldn't remember his wife's 
name (T-132-133). John was so concerned over Jim's conduct 
then that he insisted he immediately go with him to a doctor. 
They went to a Dr. Walker's office in the Boston Building, 
but the doctor was unable to see Jim on that day and an 
appointment was made for the following week (T-193). On 
leaving the doctor's office they went to the corner of Third 
South and Main Street, where Jim asked John where he was. 
He appeared lost (T-194). The following day John visited 
Jim at his apartment and told the defendant that Jim was 
sick and that he had made an appointment for him with Dr. 
Walker (T-195). The defendant cancelled Jim's appointment 
with Dr. Walker and told John that she would take him to 
her doctor, Dr. Diumenti in Bountiful (T-15) (T-202). 
John visited Jim on November 29 and found him to be 
"quite bad." He didn't want to talk and his personality seemed 
entirely changed (T-196). John never saw his brother Jim 
down town or alone again after November 26, 1956 (T-202). 
The defendant took her husband to Dr. A. E. Callahan for 
new glasses on November 28, 1956. This eye doctor found 
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that Jim was suffering from cataracts (T-211). The doctor, 
however, seeing him for the first time, said he seemed to 
respond normally to the questions (T-213). 
On December 1, John, together with his nephew Chris 
and his niece, Helen, children of his brother Peter, prevailed 
on the defendant to take Jim with them to Dr. Phil M. 
Howard (T-198). On that date Dr. Howard gave Jim a 
general physical examination and found him to be physically 
normal. No examination was made of Jim's mental condition; 
however, the doctor stated that Jim Demiris appeared mentally 
dull and did not answer or appear to comprehend the questions 
that were directed to him. These questions were promptly 
taken up and answered by the defendant, who, according to 
the doctor, "appeared to dominate the situation" (T-100). 
Dr. Howard said that from the history that was given to him 
by the defendant, namely that Jim was forgetful, having 
trouble with his legs, and would get lost and wander away 
from the apartment, he concluded that Jim was suffering 
from senile arteria sclerosis, or senile dementia, and sug-
gested that Jim consult a neurologist (T-100). The defandant 
denied telling Dr. Howard that Jim had been forgetful (T-18) 
and testified that Jim had been "very well" when Dr. Howard 
had seen him (T-23). She ~ontended that Jim did the talking 
to Dr. Howard and that the doctor had said there was nothing 
wrong with him (T-19). 
The day following Dr. Howard's examination was a 
Sunday and John and Peter Demiris, together with Peter's 
son, Chris, took Jim and the defendant for a ride down State 
Street to Midvale. During the ride Jim said very little and 
10 
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when questioned didn't recognize the town of Murray (T-132, 
T-198). After the ride they returned to Peter's home, where 
Jim was very nervous, wouldn't talk and just sat and looked 
around. He didn't seem to recognize his own brother, Peter 
(T-133) (T-193), (T-171, 172). 
On December 5, 1956 the four savings accounts consti-
tuting the first cause of action totalling $38,404.45, were 
changed from single accounts standing in Jim's name to joint 
accounts with defendant. The defendant testified that early 
in the morning of December 5, her husband awakened her 
and told her that he remembered something. Thereupon they 
went downtown together to the banks and signed the cards 
making the accounts joint (T-114). 
A day or two following the changing of the accounts 
the defendant made an appointment for her husband with 
Dr. Diumenti on December 14, 1956. On December 10, 1956 
she went with her husband to the First Security Bank, where 
they talked with Floyd Long, a trust officer, about the note 
and mortgage that the bank was collecting from the sale of 
the Oakwood Apartments. Jim's interest therein amounted to 
approximately $16,000.00 at the time. Mr. Long indicated that 
Mr. Demiris did not appear abnormal to him, but that while Jim 
was addressing him in English, the defendant was continually 
talking to Jim in Greek. He said Jim told him that he wanted 
his wife's name to be placed on the monthly remittances by 
the bank so that she could cash the checks and have some 
money if he were sick (T-258, 263). Mr. Long then prepared 
the letter of instruction (Ex. D-20) which Jim and his wife 
then signed at the Trust window (T-259). Mr. Long noted 
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that the defendant appeared anxious to get her name on the 
check and took an active part in the transaction (T-264) · 
Two friends of Mrs. Demiris, Mary Bombas and Anne 
Tiano, visited several times with the defendant and Jim dur-
ing the first two weeks of December. Mrs. Bombas thought 
Jim seemed all right on these occasions (T-273, 247). Mrs. 
Tiano testified that she did not notice anything unusual about 
Jim's converstaions (T-281). However, Lenora O'Connell, 
another friend of and witness for the defendant, who had 
lived in the Oakwood Apartments for 15 years, testified that 
she had visited Jim briefly nearly every day and that he had 
told her he did not feel good and further he appeared sick 
two or three weeks before he went to the hospital (T-286). 
She said that for a month or six weeks before his hospitalization 
he hadn't been as active and that when Mr. Demiris had 
gotten sick he had just seemed to give up (T-290). 
Mrs. Helen Tsimpoukis and Mrs. Georgia Demas, two 
Greek friends of the defendant, testified that they had heard 
about the bank accounts being transferred before Jim went to 
the hospital. Mrs. Tsimpoukis volunteered that on December 
7, 1956 at her home one of them said "He went to the bank 
and changed the books" (T-293). She also testified that she 
saw Jim again on the 12th or 13th and on the 19th or 20th 
of December. She claimed not to have noticed anything wrong 
with him on the 13th (T-294) (T-304). She admitted, how-
ever, that on December 19th, although Jim recognized her, 
talked with her, and seemed all right, that he claimed to see 
crowds of people outside of his window when there weren't 
any people there (T-295, 296). Mrs. Olympia Demiris, the 
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wife of Peter Demiris, and Helen Demiris, her daughter, both 
testified that they had visited with Mrs. T~impoukis at her 
apartment on November 25, 1956 and that she then told them 
that Jim had not been feeling well and that she was concerned 
about him (T-342). 
Mrs. Demas, an elderly Greek lady, had moved into the 
Oakwood Apartments across the hall from the Demirises a 
little over a month before Jim went to the hospital (T-328). 
She said she saw Jim a number of times and that she observed 
nothing wrong with him before he went to see Dr. Powell 
(T-320). She claimed that Jim told her the last time he went 
uptown that he had drawn the checks and money to his wife 
and they discussed that the defendant now would be able to 
take care of Jim if he became ill (T-323). Mrs. Demas then 
volunteered the fact that Jim and the defendant never had 
any fights together (T-324, 318). The defendant's physician, 
Dr. George Diumenti, saw Jim Demiris on December 14, 
1956 and gave him a physical examination. He found him to 
be physically alright, but because of the history given by the 
defendant of her husband's forgetfulness and his failure to 
respond to the doctor's questions, he referred him to a neuro-
surgeon for a determination of his mental condition. 
On December 18, 1956 Dr. Chester B. Powell, the neuro-
surgeon to whom Jim Demiris had been referred by Dr. 
Diumenti, examined him for the first time. Dr. Powell observed 
that the defendant, who was with Jim, was in a distraught, 
emotional state, while Jim sat quietly without speaking (T-63, 
65). She told the doctor that she had had her husband to 
several doctors but that they had been unable to help him 
13 
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and that she was greatly concerned about his condition (T-63, 
64). A history was obtained by Dr. Powell from both the 
defendant and John Demiris, together, that Jim had been 
very forgetful, repetitious, and confused for three weeks and 
that he had suffered a severe loss of appetite. Further, he had 
become physically inactive and had changed regarding his 
interests (T-65). The defendant not only did not dispute any 
part of this history, but was so vehement about the changes 
her husband had suffered that the doctor was inclined to dis-
count her assertions as exaggerated (T-77). After a complete 
neurological examination the doctor diagnosed the patient's 
condition as acute senile mental deterioration with irregular 
changes in the brain (T-67). He discussed this diagnosis and 
the prognosis with the defendant (T-75). At the trial, the 
defendant denied telling Dr. Powell that her husband was 
having any trouble except with his eyes and legs (T -25) and 
claimed that she noticed nothing wrong with him before Dr. 
Powell gave him "electricity for the brain" (T-16). She also 
claimed Dr. Powell said Jim was in very good condition (T-27). 
Dr. Powell was called to the Demiris apartment in the 
Oakwood on December 21, 1956, where he found Jim 
totally disorientated, sitting quietly and smiling. He imme-
diately arranged for Jim's hospitalization at the St. Mark's 
Hospital and continued to treat him until his death on January 
23, 1957 (T-77). During his hospitalization Jim remained 
in a state of total disorientation with his memory entirely 
gone. An autopsy was performed which revealed moderately 
severe nerve cell degeneration called senile placques, which 
indicate senile dementia (T -78). 
14 
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Dr. Powell testified that when he first saw Jim Demiris 
on December 18, the patient was "incompetent for all ordinary 
activities of life" (T -80), and was "unable to respond in an 
intelligent fashion or exercise any degree of judgment" (T-81). 
The doctor stated that in his opinion it was improbable and 
medically quite unlikely that Jim Demiris had been competent 
within one to four months prior to the time he had first seen 
him (T-85). On cross examination the doctor admitted that 
it was "possible" for changes to occur quite rapidly in senile 
dementia cases and that such a condition "possibly" could have 
occurred within a period of a few days (T-90). His opinion 
that the incompetency had existed 1-4 months prior to 
December 18, 1956 was made, according to the doctor, with 
reasonable medical certainty in light of all of the facts and 
circumstances (T -82, 85) including the history, the extensive 
interview and tests of the patient, the observation during 
treatment, and the results of the autopsy. 
The defendant admitted that she never had any money 
or property of her own during her marriage to Jim Demiris 
and that all of her husband's estate was owned by him (T-7). 
She further admitted that before December, 1956 she had no 
knowledge of the bank accounts, or even that her name was 
on any of them (T -34). Between the time that her husband 
was hospitalized on December 21, 1956 and his death on 
January 23, 1957 and while he was in a state of complete 
incompetence, the defendant withdrew all of the money that 
her husband had placed in the various bank accounts totalling 
$73,046.44, and cashed United States Savings Bonds held in 
their joint names totalling $9,700.00. She claimed that her 
husband had told her in December, 1956 that if he went to 
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the hospital that she should put the money in just her name 
( T -114) , however, in her deposition the defendant testified 
that Jim had told her to do this while he was in the hospital 
and that it was Jim who had cashed all the savings bonds 
(T-41-42). On cross examination she admitted the reason 
she withdrew the money was because she was afraid the 
Demirises might get it (T-49). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE DECEASED, JAMES C. DEMIRIS, WAS COMPETENT 
TO MAKE A GIFT ON DECEMBER 5, 1956, THE TIME 
OF THE PURPORTED TRANSFERS OF INTEREST IN 
HIS PERSONAL PROPERTY TO THE DEFENDANT FOR 
THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY AND OVERWHELMINGLY 
SHOWED THAT HE WAS INCOMPETENT AT THAT 
TIME. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
THAT THE DEFENDANT EXERCISED UNDUE INFLU-
ENCE AND DOMINATED HER HUSBAND IN THE 
CREATION OF THE JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS IN DE-
CEMBER OF 1956. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
DECEASED INTENDED TO MAKE A GIFT TO THE 
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DEFENDANT OF MONIES IN THE BANK ACCOUNTS 
AND U. S. SAVINGS BONDS IN THE ABSENCE OF 
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AS TO THAT 
FACT. 
POINT IV 
IF A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION IS CREATED BY 
ANY DEPOSIT CARDS THAT DECEASED INTENDED 
TO MAKE A GIFT TO DEFENDANT, PLAINTIFFS OVER-
CAME SUCH PRESUMPTION BY CLEAR AND CON-
VINCING EVIDENCE. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
DEPOSIT CARDS ON THE TWO CONTINENTAL BANK 
ACCOUNTS GRANTED ANY INTEREST THEREIN TO 
THE DEFENDANT. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE 
THAT IF A JOINT TENANCY WAS CREATED IN ANY 
OF THE ACCOUNTS AND IN THE U. S. SAVINGS 
BONDS, THAT SUCH JOINT TENANCY WAS TERMI-
NATED BY THE WITHDRAWAL BY DEFENDANT OF 
THE ENTIRE AMOUNTS IN THE ACCOUNTS AND THE 
CASHING OF THE BONDS DURING THE LIFETIME 
OF HER HUSBAND. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE DECEASED, JAMES C. DEMIRIS, WAS COMPETENT 
TO MAKE A GIFT ON DECEMBER 5, 1956, THE TIME 
OF THE PURPORTED TRANSFERS OF INTEREST IN 
HIS PERSONAL PROPERTY TO THE DEFENDANT FOR 
THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY AND OVERWHELMINGLY 
SHOWED THAT HE WAS INCOMPETENT AT THAT 
TIME. 
The test of a person's competency to create a joint tenancy 
or make a valid gift is whether he was mentally competent 
to deal with the subject before him with a full understanding 
of his rights and actually understood the nature, purpose, and 
effect of what he did. The creation and gift must be a con-
scious and purposeful act. (Maxon v. Avery, 43 C.A. (2) 155, 
110 P(2) 446). 
Before considering the various facts and circumstances 
testified to regarding the deceased's mental condition, it may 
be well to consider briefly what senile dementia is, and how 
it affected Jim's competency and ultimately contributed to his 
demise. The symptoms of senile dementia or senile deteriora-
tion of the brain are, according to Dr. Chester A. Powell, 
a neurologist, a general decrease of activity, together with 
changes in the memory, orientation, and judgment (T-71). 
The patient tends to forget the present and dwells in the 
past. He has difficulty relating himself to his environment 
and becomes confused as to where he is and how he got there. 
His judgment becomes affected so that he cannot exercise 
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normal mental processes in arriving at a decision, important 
or minor, or make a proper judgment considering facts that 
should be considered (T-71, 72). As the person's mental 
activity becomes difficult, he begins to withdraw and refrain 
from participating or performing. The emotions become blunted 
and the individual's personality changes, with depression 
being a common symptom (T-72-73). The patient being 
aware of his growing difficulty very often makes a good super-
ficial adjustment by avoiding difficult situations and contacts. 
Because of this and the fact that the early changes are subtle 
and difficult to discern, only those persons in close contact 
with the patient can observe the changes, and then sometimes 
only in retrospect (T-74). 
The testimony of the deceased's family, with the excep-
tion of his wife, clearly shows a pattern of behavior by Jim 
Demiris indicating the symptoms of senile dementia, as out-
lined by Dr. Powell, which commenced in September of 1956, 
when they first noticed his becoming forgetful and repetitious 
and developing until early December when he seemed en-
tirely changed (T-196). John Demiris saw more of Jim than 
the others and therefore observed more of his difficulties. 
He described numerous incidents of Jim's conduct which fit 
the pattern; his failing memory and repetition (T-188, 189); 
his difficulty in figuring interest on his insurance premium 
(T-197); his inability to write to their sister in early No-
vember (T-191); and of course, the day downtown, Novem-
ber 26, 1956, when Jim was so bad, not remembering his 
wife's name and not knowing where he was, that John im-
mediately took him to see Dr. Walker (T-193, 194). All of 
the family witnessed Jim's behavior on December 2, 1956 
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when they took him for a ride during which he couldn't 
remember the city of Murray and during the visit at his 
brother Peter's house, where he appeared very restless and 
uncommunicative, and failed to recognize his brother, Peter 
(T-133, 171, 172, 198). 
During this period from September through December 
other old friends noticed that Jim was becoming nervous, 
dull, and withdrawn. John Condas, a friend of 40 years, said 
that in the late summer of 1956 Jim seemed very nervous and 
couldn't sit still (T-118). Jim appeared to him to be depressed 
and dispirited (T-117, 118). 
John Pragastas, who had known Jim for 25 years, said 
that Jim seemed different in the late summer and fall of 1956, 
absent minded and broken in spirit (T-143). Mr. Pragastas 
visited Jim on his name day, (St. James Day) October 26, 
1956 with Jim's friends and relatives and supported their 
statements that Jim withdrew himself completely from the 
group and didn't say anything to his guests (T-145). Alke T. 
Diamant, who also had known Jim as a friend for many years, 
said that the last time he saw Jim in early November, 1956, 
Jim seemed worried, as if he was under a tremendous strain 
(T-158). Mrs. Jean Milligan, the deceased's landlady, reported 
that Jim became less active in the fall of 1956 and didn't 
go out as much as had been his custom. She said that Jim 
seemed forgetful and didn't seem to rcognize her (T-178). 
He forgot to pay his rent and when reminded thought it had 
been paid. This was unusual for he had always been prompt 
and had never forgotten before (T-179). Dr. Phil Howard 
gave Jim a general physical examination on December 1, 1956, 
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obtained a history from the defendant that Jim was becoming 
forgetful and wandered into the wrong apartments (T-97). 
Dr. Howard said that Jim Demiris appeared mentally dull 
at the time and did not appear to comprehend the questions 
that were addressed to him ( T -100) . The doctor therefore 
suggested that they consult a neurologist for he thought the 
patient had senile arterio-sclerosis ( T -100) . Frank Vlcek, 
a tenant and neighbor in the Oakwood for six or seven years, 
testified that Jim had told him about two months before he 
was down in bed (December, 1956) that he wasn't feeling 
good and that to him Jim "seemed different." Another 
neighbor who had known Jim for 15 years, Mrs. Lenora 
O'Connell, said that she visited Jim every day for a few 
minutes and that he told her that he didn't feel good and 
that he had acted and seemed sick two or three weeks before 
he went to the hospital (T -206). She said that he had not 
been as active for a month or six weeks before that time 
(T-289) and that when he got sick he just seemed to give up 
(T-290). 
The defendant denied that Jim had any of the troubles 
testified to by the other witnesses and claimed that the first 
time she noticed anything wrong with her husband was after 
Dr. Powell gave him "electricity for the brain." She admitted 
that Jim may have been a little forgetful before this time 
(T-16) but denied telling Dr. Howard that he had been 
forgetful. She further denied telling Dr. Powell anything 
about Jim's memory and claims she only said that Jim's eyes 
and legs were troubling him (T-25). She claimed that Dr. 
Powell told her that Jim was in a very good condition (T-27). 
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Dr. Chester Powell, however, the only medical expert 
who examined and treated Jim Demiris for his mental con-
dition, testified completely to the contrary. Not only did Dr. 
Powell state that the history obtained by him from the de-
fendant and John Demiris was that Jim had been very forgetful 
and confused for three weeks but he said that the defendant 
had been in a very distraught state over her husband's con-
dition and had told him that he had undergone changes, wasn't 
himself, and that she was greatly concerned about him (T-63 
and 64) . Mrs. Demiris had been so vehement about her 
husband's changes that the doctor was skeptical of what she 
said (T-77). During the time that the history was being taken 
from the defendant and John Demiris, Jim Demiris had sat 
quietly in the same room saying nothing. Dr. Powell then 
gave Jim a complete neurological examination which included 
an extensive interrogation of the patient to determine his 
cerebration, speech, memory, orientation and other intellectual 
capacities. Upon completion of the examination the doctor 
concluded that he was suffering from acute senile mental 
deterioration (T-67) and that he was incompetent for all 
ordinary activities of life, being unable to communicate or 
respond intelligently, with no ability to initiate physical or 
mental activity on his own accord. He was not orientated in 
space or time and his memory was grossly deficient (T-80). 
In addition, he was unable to respond in an intelligent fashion 
or exercise any degree of judgment (T-81). The doctor in-
formed the defendant of his diagnosis together with the 
prognosis that her husband would continue to get worse and 
ultimately become a nursing problem (T-75). 
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On December 21, 1956 the doctor was called to the 
Demiris apartment where he found Jim Demiris totally dis-
orientated, requiring immediate hospitalization ( T -77) . During 
the time of the hospitalization the doctor reported that Jim 
Demiris continued in a state of total disorientation with his 
memory completely gone until his death on January 23, 1957 
(T-77-78). Dr. Powell's diagnosis was confirmed by an 
autopsy performed after Jim's death which revealed moderately 
severe senile placques or nerve cell deterioration indicative 
of senile dementia (T -79). When asked his opinion as to 
how long the patient had been in a state of mental incompe-
tency prior to December 18, 1956, when the doctor had first 
seen him, Dr. Powell replied that it was his opinion given 
with reasonable medical certainty that it was improbable and 
medically quite unlikely that Jim Demiris had been competent 
within a period of one to four months prior to December 18, 
1956 (T-85). 
In light of such convincing medical evidence, amply 
supported as it was with lay-witnesses who described actiom 
by Jim Demiris as early as September of 1956, which indicated 
senile dementia, it is difficult to understand how the trial 
court was not compelled to find that Jim Demiris was incom-
petent on December 5, 1956. However, a reading of the trial 
court's memorandum decision rendered at the conclusion of 
the case reveals that the court misinterpreted or misconstrued 
completely Dr. Powell's testimony by the statement in the 
decision regarding this testimony. It is submitted that Dr. 
Powell, who gave the only medical testimony on competency, 
was as positive and definite as a careful, qualified specialist 
could be when he gave his considered opinion that Jim 
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Derniris had been incompetent from one to four months prior 
to December ~8. The admission on cross examination that 
apparently so i~pressed the trial court that it was medically 
"possible" for the patient's deterioration to have occurred in 
a shorter period of time did not in any way balance or negative 
the measured, calculated opinion of this specialist. The 
defendant offered no medical testimony in rebuttal to Dr. 
Powell, although she had Dr. Madison Thomas, another 
neurosurgeon, present during all of Dr. Powell's testimony. 
The defendant's witnesses, Dr. Diumenti and Dr. Callahan, 
merely testified as to general observations as to the deceased's 
appearance and actions like all of the other lay-witnesses, 
including plaintiffs' witness Dr. Phil M. Howard. 
The witnesses offered by the defendant, including her 
old friends, Mrs. Bombas, Tiano and Tsimpoukis, did not 
testify as to anything about Jim Derniris which they observed 
that would be inconsistent with a condition of senile dementia. 
They all merely claimed to have seen and talked with Jim 
in November and December and that they remembered nothing 
unusual about him. It should be noted that the testimony of 
Mrs. Tiano and Mrs. Bombas clearly indicate that as good 
freinds of the defendant their contacts with Jim would be 
very casual and that during their visits they spent their time 
conversing with the defendant and not Jim Demiris. The 
volunteered testimony of defendant's other friends, Mrs. 
Tsimpoukis and Mrs. Demas, that Jim and his wife never 
fought causes their whole testimony to be viewed with skepti-
cism in the face of the testimony of all other persons who 
knew the Demirises or lived near them. Mrs. Demas's state-
ment that Jim seemed all right until Dr. Powell gave him 
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electricty for his brain also doesn't ring true for it was almost 
in the identical language used to express the same contention 
by the defendant (T-16). All of the testimony of the de-
fendant's friends should be scrutinized carefully after Mrs. 
Vlcek explained how the defendant asked her not to tell of 
their fights and even how to express her denial ( T-3 3 5) . 
Dr. Powell made it abundantly clear that someone suffer-
ing from senile dementia is not a madman or a person with 
a gross or unusual behaviour pattern but rather is someone 
whose changes and complaints are of a very subtle and gradual 
nature so that even those persons who have known him well 
and had a good opportunity to observe his actions might only 
recall some of the symptoms in retrospect (T-74). A person 
incompetent from senile dementia can still talk, walk, and re-
spond to simple situations or casual converstaion (Ex. D-9). 
However, the gradual brain deterioration destroys the power to 
plan, reason, remember or otherwise think clearly and independ-
ently. The testimony of Mrs. Tsimpoukis is a classic example of 
this difficulty to observe these gradual changes in a person 
suffering from senile dementia by a lay person. She testified 
that even on December 19, 1956 when she saw Jim in his 
apartment he recognized her and seemed all right except 
for the fact that he claimed to see crowds of people outside 
his window when no one was actually there (T-303, 304). 
This was one day after Dr. Powell's initial examination 
of December 18, 1956 when he found Jim "incompetent for 
all ordinary activities of life" (T -80) and two days before 
the doctor found him to be "totally disorientated" (T-77). 
The difficulty in observing the symptoms of senile dementia 
explains all of the testimony of the defendant's witnesses 
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including the Doctors Diumenti and Callaghan and Mr. Floyd 
Long of the First Security Bank. Mr. Long saw Jim Demiris 
tQgether with his wife on December 10, 1956 when at the 
apparent urging and prompting of the defendant (T-259, 263) 
Jim Demiris told Mr. Long that he wished to have her name 
placed on the checks that were sent to him "so she could cash 
it and have some money if he was sick" (T-258). It is sub-
mitted that, while Jim Demiris may not have performed in 
an unusual manner, this statement does not indicate a com-
petent mental condition for if he had remembered and under-
stood his actions of just five days before on December 5 in 
signing the joint bank account cards with his wife, he would 
have known that he thereby had given her access to some 
$38,000.00. 
In Maxon vs. Avery, supra, the California Supreme Court 
held that the test of competency of an individual to create 
a valid joint tenacy is whether such person actually under-
stood the nature, purpose, and effect of what he did. This is 
substantially the same test as is applied by the Utah courts 
in determining whether a person had sufficient mental capacity 
to make a Will. This Court In Re Hanson's Estate, 87 Utah 
580, 52 P (2) 1103, said at Page 1116: 
''The true test is as to whether the testatrix had 
sufficient mind and memory (at the time of making 
the Will) to remember who \Yere the natural objects 
of her bounty, recall to mind her property, and dis-
pose of it understandingly, according to some plan 
formed in her mind." 
See also for a statement of this rule In Re Butters Estate, 123 
Utah 603 261 P(2) 174. 
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j; 
In Wells Fargo Bank v. Brady, 116 C.A. (2) 381, 254 
P(2) 71, an action similar to the one at bar was brought by 
the administrator of an estate to recover funds transferred 
by the decedent· into joint tenancy accounts. The facts showed 
that shortly before her death the decedent, accompanied by a 
niece, called at four different banks and effected transfers 
therein of her bank accounts from her individual name into 
the names of the decedent, the niece, and the niece's daughter 
as joint tenants. It was alleged that the deceased was of un-
sound mind at the time of the transfers and that undue 
influence was asserted on her by her niece and her daughter. 
The jury returned an advisory verdict in favor of the estate 
and against joint tenants. This decision setting aside the 
transfers into joint tenancy was affirmed upon appeal. This 
case restated the rule announced in Maxom v. Avery, supra. 
For other cases touching upon this question see In Re Ginsburg 
Estate, 11 C.A. (2) 210, 53 P.(2) 397, and Olsen v. Wash-
ington, 18 C.A. (2) 85, 63 P(2) 304. 
The leading Utah case wherein mental incompetency 
from senile dementia was an issue is the case of In Re Swan's 
Estate, 51 Utah 410, 170 P. 452. The contestants to the 
deceased's Will contended that the deceased was afflicted 
with senile dementia at the time he made his Last Will and 
Testament and that the Will should not be permitted to stand. 
While there was some medical testimony to this effect, the 
doctors who testified had not seen the deceased for diagnosis 
and treatment and merely gave their opinion based upon 
casual observation and hypothetical questions. There was 
considerable testimony presented by both sides from lay wit-
nesses concerning their observations of the deceased and 
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their opmron as to his mental condition. The judgment of 
the trial court sustaining the Will was reversed in the Supreme 
Court on the first hearing and upon reconsideration the Court 
changed its opinion and affirmed the trial court's original 
finding. The Court based its affirmance principally upon the 
ground that the deceased made the will out himself, had his 
attorney prepare it and then obtained three subscribing wit-
nesses who were friends of his of long standing, men of sound 
and discerning judgment, who all testified that at the time 
he executed the Will he appeared sound and healthy. The 
Court relied heavily upon the fact that deceased continued 
to transact his business for several months after he had made 
his Will. In that case the Court recognized that there was a 
question as to whether or not the deceased actually had senile 
dementia and that the medical testimony left this question 
open. This, of course, is not the situation in the case presently 
before this Court where the medical testimony that James 
Demiris had senile dementia was made by a specialist whose 
opinion was based upon his extensive examination and sub-
sequent treatment which was later borne out by an autopsy. 
Another distinction between the Swan case and the case 
at bar is the fact that the Swan case was a law case and this 
case is an equity case. In the Swan case the Court said that 
it must, in considering the sufficiency of the evidence, be 
limited to the consideration merely as to whether or not 
there is substantial evidence to sustain the .findings. There are 
numerous decisions from this Court which note the broader 
views afforded by the appellate court in equity cases. In Jensen 
v. Howell, 75 Utah 64, 282 P. 1034, this Court said that in 
an equity case, the duty and responsibility of the Supreme 
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Jf{ 
Court is to rev1ew both questions of law and fact which in 
effect is a trial de novo on the record. On such a review if 
the Supreme Court is persuaded that a challenged finding is 
against a fair preponderance or greater weight of the evidence, 
or not supported by it, the Court should disapprove the finding 
or direct another finding, or remand the case for further 
proceedings. In Paxton v. Paxton, 80 Utah 540, 553 15 P(2) 
1051, the Court said that in suits in equity the parties are en-
titled to review and determination by the Supreme Court on 
questions of fact as well as questions of law but that the 
findings made by the Trial Court should not be disturbed 
unless the Supreme Court is convinced they are wrong; when 
so convinced, however, it becomes the duty of the Supreme 
Court to set them aside. This rule was repeated in Silver King 
Consolidated Mining Co. v. Sutton, 85 Utah 297 39 P(2) 
683, where it was held that the duty of the Supreme Court 
in equity appeal was to examine the evidence, determine its 
weight and reach its own conclusions with respect thereto. 
A statutory definition of incompetency is found in Sec-
tion 75-13-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which defines an 
incompetent for the purpose of appointing a guardian as 
follows: 
"75-13-20. INCOMPETENT PERSONS - DEFI-
NITIONS. The words 'incompetent,' 'mentally incom-
petent' and 'incapable,' as used in this title, shall be 
construed to mean any person who, though not insane, 
is, by reason of old age, disease, weakness of mind, 
or from any other cause, unable, unassisted to properly 
manage and take care of himself or his property, and 
by reason thereof would be likely to be deceived or 
imposed upon by artful or designing persons." 
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We acknowledge our burden of establishing the incom-
petency of Jim Demiris by a preponderance of the evidence. 
We submit that this was clearly done, and that the evidence 
of incompetency was substantial and convincing, and as com-
plete as possible in a case of a senile dementia where the 
symptoms begin and death occurs within a period of some 
five months. Is it probable or even reasonable to assume that 
after manifesting the symptoms of senile dementia that James 
Demiris did show for a three month period prior to December 
5, 1956, that he was competent and of sound, disposing, 
independent mind on that date, which was 13 days before 
Dr. Powell found him incompetent for all ordinary pur-
poses; and in light of the doctor's expert opinion stated with 
reasonable 1nedical certainty that Jim Demiris had been in-
competent from one to four months before December 18, 1956. 
It is respectfully submitted that after a careful examination 
of all of the evidence in this case this Court will be compelled 
to conclude that the trial court was in error and that a finding 
should be made that James C. Demiris was incompetent on 
December 5, 1956, and that the joint accounts created on 
that day should be set aside. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
THAT THE DEFENDANT EXERCISED UNDUE INFLU-
ENCE AND DOMINATED HER HUSBAND IN THE 
CREATION OF THE JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS IN DE-
CEMBER OF 1956. 
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Direct evidence as to undue influence is rarely obtainable 
and hence a Court must determine the issue of undue influence 
by inferences drawn from all the facts and circumstances. 
Taken singly the facts and circumstances may be of little 
weight, but taken collectively they acquire their proper weight 
and may then be sufficient in raising a presumption or sus-
taining a finding of undue influence. Wells Fargo Bank v. 
Brady, 116 C.A. (2) 381, 254 P. (2) 71. 
The evidence revealed that James C. Demiris during his 
lifetime was a frugal, hard-working man who had been suc-
cessful in his business affairs. He was able to read and write 
the English language, and had a good command of English. 
He had a close relationship with both of his brothers here in 
America, John and Peter, socially and in a business way, and 
he joined with them in helping their less fortunate brothers 
and sister in Greece. The evidence showed that whenever the 
deceased had independent advice or expressed his desires and 
intentions away from the presence and influence of his wife, 
he indicated that he wanted each of his brothers and sister 
to share in his estate, and made provision for them in his 
Wills. 
While the deceased had a friendly relationship with his 
brothers and sister, he had a very unhappy marriage with the 
defendant, filled with quarrels and fights over money and 
her desire to get him back to Greece (T -106, 117, 129, 142, 
154, 161, 177, 186, 289). The defendant returned without 
her husband to Greece on two occasions during their 31 years 
of marriage, and stayed on those occasions approximately 13 
years ( T -168) . The marital troubles existed during most of 
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their married life together, and became so serious on two oc-
casions, one in 1951 and the other in the year before he died, 
that her husband consulted attorneys concerning a divorce 
from the defendant (T-117,154). While Mrs. Demiris con-
tended that they had a happy marriage without quarrels and 
fights, and that at no time did they consider divorce (T-8, 9, 
11), Mr. E. R. Callister, Jr., testified that in 1951 the defendant 
and her husband were separated for over a month's time and 
that during this period he conducted divorce negotiations on 
Jim's behalf with the defendant or her counsel, Mr. N. J. 
Cotro-lvianes, and at Jim's request offered the defendant 
$10,000.00 to leave her husband (T-117). In the fall of 
1956 James Demiris consulted Mr. Alke T. Diamant, another 
attorney, and requested his advice on a divorce from his wife. 
He told Mr. Diamant that his life with her was intolerable 
and that he would be willing to give her as much as $40,00.00 
to leave him (T. 154). He expressed to Mr. Diamant his 
fear that his wife's family might poison him and get all his 
money. Jim said that he wanted his brothers and sister to 
share in his estate and that he wanted Mr. Diamant to check 
over his Will that Mr. Callister had prepared to be sure that 
they would get a share when he died ( T. 15 5) . 
Jim confided about his marital troubles on a number 
of occasions with his old friend, John Pragastis, and in August 
or September of 1956 told him that his life with his wife 
was unbearable and that the only thing to do was to obtain 
a divorce (T. 142). The incident related by Mr. Ted Jouflas 
of how he had seen the defendant and her husband downtown 
in the summer of 1956 is significant. He heard them arguing 
in Greek over Jim's money. The defendant was swearing at 
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Jim in a very profane way and said to him that he didn't have 
much longer to go and when he died she would get his money 
(T. 161-162). The defendant admitted to Mrs. Frank Vlcek 
in the late summer of 1956 that she and her husband had 
been fighting over his money and that she had offered to 
leave him for $60,000.00 (T. 150). 
There was considerable evidence from which an inference 
could be drawn that the defendant exercised undue influence 
over her husband and dominated him. The story reported by 
Jim's attorney, E. R. Callister, Jr., as to how the three wills 
were dra\vn in March of 1952 clearly indicated her efforts 
to dominate Jim in his affairs. The first will drawn by Mr. 
Callister at Jim's request provided specific bequests for his 
four brothers and one sister of $5,000.00 each. The following 
week Jim returned with his wife and had a new will drawn 
which cut out entirely his two brothers here in Salt Lake City, 
Peter and John, and reduced the bequests to the two brothers 
and one sister jn Greece to $1,000.00, giving all of the balance 
to his wife, and in the event of her prior death, equally divided 
his estate between his family and defendant's family. The 
very next day James Demiris returned alone to Mr. Callister's 
office and advised him that the Will drawn the day before had 
been made solely to appease his wife, and he thereupon directed 
drawn the Will that was admitted to probate, leaving bequests 
of $10,000.00 each to his four brothers and one sister, the 
balance to his wife, and in the event of her prior death, all 
of his estaate to be divided equally between the Intervenors 
(T-105). Dr. Howard testified that at the time he examined 
Jim Demiris on December 1, his wife dominated the situation 
and answered all of the questions thta he directed to Jim 
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(T-100). Mr. Pragastis told how on Jim's name day, October 
26, 1956, when Jim tried to speak, defendant became angry 
at him and Jim became "petrified" and remained silent (T-146). 
The defendant denied having known of Jim's bank ac-
counts prior to December 5, 1956, and stated that she had no 
knowledge of the effect of a joint account (T-34). She 
claimed she had never questioned anyone about such accounts 
(T-39). Frank Vleck, however, testified that about December 
2nd or 3rd, 1956, the defendant c3;_me to his apartment in the 
Oakwood with an American Savings Bank Book of an account 
in Jim's name alone, containing $10,000.00, and asked him 
if she would be able to withdraw the money. He said he told 
her that it would be necessary for her to have her name on 
it before she could withdraw the funds (T-56). Mr. Alke 
Diamant also stated that Mrs. Demiris had questioned him 
about joint accounts and he had advised her concerning them 
(T. 156-157). Is it not significant that right after obtaining 
this information, that she now denies obtaining, she went 
with her husband to every bank in which he had an account 
in his own name and the accounts were made joint? It i5 
submitted that these continual fights, quarrels and difficultie5 
over money had their effect upon Jim so that when he was in 
a weakened mental condition, confused, frightened and dis-
turbed, and at a time when, in the words of Mrs. O'Connell, 
he just seemed to give up, his wife finally succeeded in forc-
ing him to give over to her the control of all his assets. That 
there was trouble and pressures to which Jim was subjected 
and from which he tried without avail to escape is evident 
from the incident related by Frank Vleck, which occurred in 
early December. He observed the defendant chasing after Jim 
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down stairs of the apartment. Defendant said to him, "He 
wants to go outside. He is crazy." Whereupon Jim pulled his 
fist back as if to strike her and said, "She is too smart" ( T-55) . 
Such facts certainly establish more than mere suspicious 
circumstances, requiring careful appraisal by the Court. This 
is particularly true in light of the defendant's subsequent con-
duct jn hurriedly withdrawing all of the accounts and cashing 
the United States Savings Bonds, thereby reducing to her 
possession the sum of some $82,000.00, the bulk of her hus-
band's estate, while he was in a hospital in a state of complete 
incompetency. Dr. Powell testified that persons suffering from 
senile dementia are notoriously easily influenced and made 
the following comment which we submit is recognized by the 
courts: 
"These people suffering from this contition (senile 
dementia) are often victimized by others who take 
advantage of their inability to exercise proper judg-
ment and, I am sure, most attorneys and judges have 
seen cases previously where problems come up of this 
sort." 
(A) The defendant had the burden of proving a lack 
of undue influence because of her confidential relation-
ship as wife of the deceased, together with the facts and 
circumstances indicating that she had taken advantage of 
him by the creation of the joint accounts shortly before 
her husband's death and in opposition to his declared 
intentions and the provisions of his Last Will, and the 
defendant failed in meeting this burden. 
It is submitted that the law recognizes a confidential 
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relationship exists between a man and his wife. This Court 
In Re Bryan's Estate, 82 Ut. 390, 25 P(2) 602, stated: 
"The influence over a testator of one who is his wife, 
child guardian attorney spiritual advisor, or who oc-
cupi;s ·some o;her confide1;tial relation to him is not 
necessarily undue influence although it may, when 
coupled with other circumstances, raise a presumption 
of undue influence." 
In Glover v. Glover, 121 Ut. 362, 242 P(2) 298, a divorce 
proceeding, this Court again recognized the confidential re-
lationship betwen a husband and his wife. 
Another case involving a husband and wife was the case 
of Miller v. Livingston, 31 Utah 415 88 P. 338. In this case the 
wife was the sole beneficiary under her husband's will which 
she had procured and given instructions as to its terms. The 
Court held that while there was no presumption of undue 
influence, the relationship was such as to raise a suspicion 
requiring vigilance of the Court. While In Re Swan's Estate, 
4 Ut. (2) 277, 293 P(2) 682, expressly overruled both Miller 
v. Livingston and In Re Bryan's Estate to the effect of the 
presumption of undue influence and the burden of persuasion 
with respect thereto, these cases are still good authority for 
the proposition \hat there is a confidential relationship exist-
ing between a husband and wife. Another Utah case concern-
ing the question of undue influence between persons in the 
same family is the case of Jardine vs. Archibald, 3 Utah 2d 
88, 279 P(2) 454, wherein it was determined that a confi-
dential relationship existed between a mother and her son 
and daughter and that the burden was on the son and daughter 
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to prove that they did not unduly influence their mother in 
her making gifts to them. 
There are a number of reported cases from the California 
Appellate Courts involving this question of undue influence 
between a husband and wife. Dale v. Dale, 87 C.A. 359, 262 P. 
339 is a leading case cited a number of times by the California 
courts. In that case the District Court of Appeals held: 
"In transactions between a husband and wife the 
rule with respect to confidential relations restrains and 
precludes either from obtaining an unfair advantage 
of the other through fraud, mistake, or undue influence. 
Such transactions are considered subject to the rules 
which effect the relationship of trustee and beneficiary, 
their relationship is, in fact, presumed to be confiden-
tial (citations) and where either obtains an advantage 
over the other, the transaction is presumed to have 
been without adequate consideration, and to have been 
secured through undue influence, and the burden is then 
upon him who had the advantage to show that it was 
fair and free from fraud and undue influence." 
Morris v. Berman, 159 C.A. (2) 770, 324 P(2) 601 
cited with approval the rule recited in Dale v. Dale and held 
that if the wife unduly profits or gains an advantage by reason 
of her confidential relationship, that a presumption of undue 
influence arises. These cases, while recognizing the confiden-
tial relationship and the influence of a wife admittedly, do 
not hold that such influence is presumed to be undue unless 
it appears from the particular transaction that the marital 
confidence was used to take advantage or that the confidence 
was subsequently violated. See Morris v. Berman, supra. 
In 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Section 956 et seq., the 
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author restates the rule that there is a confidential relationship 
between a husband and wife, and reports where it appears 
that the wife was in a superior or stronger position, the pre-
sumption of undue influence applies to her. The author said: 
"In every transaction between them by which the 
superior party obtains a possible benefit, equity raises 
a presumption against its validity and casts upon that 
party the burden of proving affirmatively compliance 
with equitable requisites and of thereby overcoming 
the presumption." 
This court In Re Swan's Estate, 293 P (2) 682 at Page 691, 
cited the above Section of Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence 
with approval. 
In 26 Am. Jur., Page 876, Paragraph 268, Husband and 
Wife, it is reported: 
"The relationship of husband and wife is generally 
regarded as a confidential nature. In many jurisdictions, 
particularly the community property jurisdictions, stat-
utes expressly provide that transactions between them 
shaH be subject to the general law governing trans-
actions between persons in a confidential relationship. 
If there is any misrepresentations or any concealment 
of material facts, or any just suspicion of artifice or 
undue influence, courts of equity will interpose and 
pronounce the transaction void and as far as possible 
restore the parties to their original rights. Equity will 
enforce agreements between the spouses only where 
they are fair and just and free from fraud, undue in-
fluence, duress and overeaching." 
Paragraph 270 on Page 878 deals specifically with the pro-
tection of the husband and reports the law to be as follows: 
"Equity will, in general, relieve a husband from his 
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contracts with, or conveyance or transfer, to his wife, 
obtained by her fraud, undue influence, overreaching 
of him, etc., by means of her confidential relation with 
him, especially where the circumstances are such that 
the husband is so dependent on the wife and so aged 
and weak in mind and body that he may easily be 
subjected to her undue influence, overeaching, etc.; and 
in such a situation, it has been held, a conveyance or 
transfer from him to her will not be sustained or en-
forced without affirmative proof that his act was in-
telligently done without undue influence. Hence, if a 
wife by fraud and imposition on her huband induces 
him voluntarily to transfer property to her or for her 
benefit, a court of equity will afford him relief and 
compel a reconveyance." 
For other authorities to this effect see Peyton v. Peyton Cor-
poration et al, 7 Atl. 2d 737, 123 A.L.R. 1482; Barker v. 
Barker, 27 N.W. 2d 576, 171 A.L.R. 447, and 56 L.R.A. 817. 
While the evidence in this case discloses that the de-
fendant and her deceased husband had continuing marital 
difficulties and that he had never given her control or a share 
in any of his estate, which was a cause of marital friction, 
it is clear from the facts that they lived together as man and 
wife in a small apartment during some 18 years of their 
married life. It is evident that there must have been between 
them, as in the case of any two married people living together, 
a relationship requiring certain trust and confidence. Thi~ 
became even more necessary when in the last few months of 
Jim Demiris' life his health failed; he began having trouble 
with his eyes, his legs, his memory, and his mental processes, 
thereby of necessity having to rely more and more for assist-
ance upon the defendant. After November 26, 1956, Jim 
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Demiris never left their apartment except in her company, 
and he was never thereafter seen alone by his friends or 
relatives. While her husband was in such a condition of de-
pendence and disability, the defendant took him to each of 
his banks where portions of his estate were located in various 
savings accounts, and made certain that these accounts were 
placed under her control and made readily accessible to her. 
Shortly thereafter she obtained all of her husband's funds 
and assets, thereby completely wiping him out with the excep-
tion of his interest in the note and mortgage being collected 
by the First Security Bank, at a time when he was helpless 
in the hospital. These transactions, giving defendant control 
and possession of the estate, were in direct opposition and 
conflict to the decedent's Will and the intentions previously 
expressed by him on all reported occasions, namely, that he 
did not wish his wife to have all of his money, and that it 
was his desire to have his brothers and sister share in his 
estate. It is respectfully ubmitted that under these facts, it 
clearly appears that the defendant took unfair advantage of 
the marital confidence and dependency of her husband and 
subsequently violated this confidence. Under such circum-
stances, the burden of persuasion should be cast upon her, 
who obtained this unfair advantage, to show it was fair and 
free from fraud and undue influence. In Re Swan's Estate, 
supra. 
The Supreme Court of Virginia in Hartman v. Strickler, 
82 Virginia 255, said: 
"Wherever a Will executed by an old man differs 
from his previously expressed intentions and is made in 
favor of those \vho stand in relation of confidence or 
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dependence toward him, it raises a violent presump-
tion of fraud and undue influence which should be 
overcome by satisfactory testimony." 
See also Olsen v. Washington, 18 C.A.(2) 85 63 P(2) 304, 
where it was held that where there is an old person, broken in 
health and worn down mentally so that her actions may readily 
be influenced by those in whom she had confidence, and it ap-
pears that one who has her confidence emerges with a goodly 
price for which no consideration was given, an inference arises, 
capable of sustaining a finding that undue influence has been 
used. 
The only explanation that can be offered for the trial 
Court's finding on the undue influence question in this case is 
that instead of having a confidential relationship determined, 
because of the facts and circumstances, thereby shifting the 
burden of persuasion to the defendant, the Trial Court clothed 
the defendant, because she was decedent's wife, with a pre-
sumption of innocence that was irrebutable. 
The defendant failed completely in sustaining any burden, 
for she introduced no evidence whatever to indicate that the 
transaction creating the joint tenancies on December 5, 1956, 
was without fraud or undue influence on her part. Her only 
statement with respect to these matters was that her husband 
early that morning had said to her that he remembered some-
thing and then took her downtown without further explana-
tion to change these accounts. That this is unlikely is manifest, 
particularly in the light of the fact that the defendant was 
thoroughly impeached concerning her testimony that she and 
her husband never fought, that he was perfectly well until 
Dr. Powell put electricity in his brain, that she did not tell 
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Dr. Howard nor Dr. Powell that her husband was sick or that 
his memory was failing, that she did not inquire about the 
bank accounts, etc. It should also be noted that the defendant 
did not even testify in her own defense, and the only evidence 
obtained from her was by interrogation as an adverse witness 
as part of the plaintiff's case. 
(B) Should this Court determine that the relation-
ship of the defendant and her deceased husband and the 
circumstances of the transfers were not such as to create 
a presumption of undue influence against the defendant, 
so that the burden of proof remained with the parties 
urging such undue influence, it is respectfully submitted 
that this burden of proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence was clearly and convincingly met. 
There are a number of cases that have been decided by 
this court on the question of undue influence, most of which 
were reviewed in the second Swan case, supra. Such a case 
is In Re Lavelle's Estate, 122 Ut. 253, 248 P(2) 372. In 
this case this Court held that mere opportunity, interest, con-
fidential relationship, or weakened physical condition of the 
testator held no presumption of undue influence, but that 
these factors or combination of them do provide fertile 
ground for the exercise of such influence, and where they 
exist the Court is under a duty to carefully scrutinize the facts 
and circumstances relating to the execution of the Will in 
question. Taking the factors recognized in the Lavelle case 
as providing fertile ground for the exercise of undue influence 
and applying them to the evidence in this case, we have the 
following: 
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1. Weakened physical condition-The testimony clearly 
showed that James Demiris was slipping physically and men-
tally prior to December 5, 1956. The fact that his relatives had 
insisted on two occasions, November 26, 1956 and December 
l, 1956, that Jim go to a doctor clearly shows that something 
seemed wrong with him at the time. His wife's declarations 
to Drs. Howard and Powell before any litigation resulted 
as to her husband's difficulties and condition are especially 
significant. On December 1 she told Dr. Howard that Jim 
was having trouble with his legs, that he was forgetful and 
wandered into other people's apartment. The doctor reported 
that Jim appeared mentally dull and did not seem to answer 
or comprehend his questions. The defendant was so distraught 
over her husband's condition on December 18 that Dr. Powell 
tended to discount some of her statements regarding her 
husband's changes. She reported at that time that Jim had 
been very forgetful and confused for over three weeks and 
there were other noticeable changes in his behavior. Dr. 
Powell, on the 18th, found Jim to be incompetent for all 
ordinary activities. This was only 13 days after the purported 
transfers of the accounts on December 5. In addition there 
was all of the other testimony of the friends and relatives as 
to Jim's changes and failing condition since September of 
1956. 
2. Opportunity - The defendant, as the wife of the 
deceased, spent more time with him and had a closer relation-
ship than any other person. She was alone with him every 
night, and after November 26, 1956, Jim Demiris was never 
out of her presence to obtain any independent advice or help 
from other people. 
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3. Interest or Motive-By her own admissions the de-
fendant had no money or estate of her own. The testimony 
indicated quarrels over an extended period of time concerning 
finances and her desire to get her husband and his money back 
to Greece. It was obvious in December of 1956, seven years 
after Jim Demiris had retired in 1949, that she was never 
going to realize her desire of living in Greece so long as her 
husband remained alive. Thus, she must wait until his death 
to go back to her homeland. She had never been given 
control or possession of any of her husband's bank accounts 
or other assets and must have been aware, because of his many 
declarations and his prior Wills, of his desire to leave part 
of his estate to his brothers and sister. Her questioning of 
Alke Diamant and Frank Vlcek concerning her husband's 
bank b )oks and how she would be able to withdraw them, 
clearly showed her schemes and desires to reduce all of his 
assets to her possession. It is significant that she guiltily denied 
these facts testified to by these disinterested witnesses. 
What then are the probabilities? Is it probable that after 
a marital history of separation, divorce consultations, constant 
quarreling and fights, Jim Demiris suddenly, independently 
and contrary to his clearly expressed intentions changed his 
mind and freely and voluntarily gave to his wife practically 
everything he owned? Is it probable in light of the close rela-
tionship and affection that Jim had with his brothers and 
sister and the concern he felt for the three less fortunate 
members of his family in Greece, particularly the sick sister 
to whom he was sending money as late as November of 1956, 
that less than qne month later he would cut her off too-ether 
' b 
with his brothers, from any interest in his estate? Is it not 
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obvious from all the evidence that when Jim was in a weak, 
enfeebled and frightened condition, caused by his physical 
and mental failing; that he finally succumbed to the continuous 
pressures and threats that had been asserted against him, and 
because of defendant's undue influence, changed his habitual 
control of his money? 
It is respectfully submitted that the circumstantial evidence 
m this case is so strong and irresistable as to require the 
conclusion that the action of the decedent, James Demiris, in 
creating the joint accounts on December 5, 1956 was the result 
of a weakened mental condition that was taken unfair ad-
vantage of by the defendant. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 'THE 
DECEASED INTENDED TO MAKE A GIFT TO THE 
DEFENDANT OF MONIES IN THE BANK ACCOUNTS 
AND U. S. SAVINGS BONDS IN THE ABSENCE OF 
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AS TO THAT 
FACT. 
Under Utah law, one claiming a gift of an interest in a 
bap.k account against the estate of a decedent "takes upon 
himself a heavy burden, which he must support by evidence 
of great probative force, which clearly establishes every 
element of a valid gift," Christensen v. Ogden State Bank, 
75 Ut. 478, 286 P. 638. See also Holman v. Deseret Savings 
Bank, 41 Utah 340, 124 P. 765. The joint form of the account 
~ creates no presumption that a joint tenancy or gift was 111-
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tended, Holman v. Deseret Savings Bank, supra; Boyle v. 
Dinsdale, 45 Utah 112, 143 P. 136; Olson v. Scott, 61 Utah 
42, 210 P. 987. These rulings follow the law concerning 
other gift situations where the claimant of an inter vives 
gift bears the burden of proving the gift by clear and con-
vincing evidence, Lovett v. Continental Bank, 4 Utah 2d 76, 
286 P. 2d 106 5, and showing a clear and unmistakable inten-
tion on the part of the donor to mak~ a gift, Jones v. Cook, 
118 Utah 562, 233 P.2d 423. 
However, if two persons sign a joint account card, pre-
pared by the bank for its own protection but purporting to 
establish rights between the signatories, they are said to have 
"entered a contract," Holt v. Bayles, 85 Utah 364; 39 P.2d 
715, and the courts are bound by the agreement, First Security 
Bank v. Burgi, 122 Utah 445, 251 P.2d 297, despite the fact 
that no consideration is given by one of the parties. 
If the words used on the particular bank's form deposit 
cards warrant it, a presumption arises that joint tenancy was 
intended, which presumption must be rebutted by "clear and 
convincing proof'' if both parties are alive at time of suit, 
Neill v. Royce, 101 Utah 181, 120 P.2d 327. If the account 
is to be partitioned, it is presumed that each of the parties 
owns one-half of the amount on deposit, despite the fact 
that either has the power to withdraw all, Greener v. Greener, 
116 Utah 571, 212 P.2d 194. 
The greatest difficulty with the Utah cases, however, 
occurs when one of the two parties to the joint deposit dies. 
Then the presumption becomes conclusive and no proof may 
be entered by his heirs of an intent other than that expressed 
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i: 
in the bank-prepared deposit card, according to Holt v. Bayles, 
supra. In the most recent case in this area, Greener v .. Greener, 
supra, Justice Wade, in special concurrence, pointed out that 
the cases create a confusion of burdens of proof, each side 
requiring clear and convincing evidence, since the money 
could only pass by virtue of a gift if there is no consideration 
in the agreement of deposit. He is able to reconcile the cases 
into two lines of authority with the exception of Holt v. Bayles: 
( 1) a contract situation with consideration passing requiring 
clear and convincing evidence on the part of the original 
owner to overcome the terms of his contract, ( 2) a gift situ-
ation, regardless of the bank-drawn instrument, requiring the 
donee to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
gift was made. 
Also in Greener v. Greener, Justice Wolfe, writing the 
majority opinion, expressed some concern over the court-made 
rule that the expression of intent found in the bank cards is 
conclusive upon the heirs of the deceased depositor. He sug-
gests that the court has gone astray by following cases decided 
in states having a statute creating a conclusive presumption 
and providing a form which will evoke this presumption, (see 
annotations at 103 A.L.R. 1133; 48 C.J.S., Joint Tenancy, 
sec. 3 ( 2) p. 922), but a consideration of this point was not 
necessary to the disposition of Greener v. Greener. 
Sin~e all of the evidence received by the court shows 
no gift was intended and only the language of the bank account 
cards stand to support Mrs. Demiris' claim of a gift, as dis-
cussed in Point IV, infra, appellants conclude that the trial 
court must have applied a conclusive presumption adverse to 
them. 
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A. The Appellants Urge a Reconsideration of the Hold-
ing in the Misfit Holt v. Bayles case. 
The Utah Joint Deposits Statute, U.C.A. 1953, 7-3-45, is 
unlike statutes such as that of New York discussed in Mosko-
witz v. Marrow, 251 N.Y. 380, 167 N.E. 506, 66 A.L.R. 871, 
in that it provides no guide as to what type of language will 
create a joint tenancy or shift the burden of proof in an instance 
of adverse claims. In fact, the statute is not concerned at all 
with the relationship between the depositors but seeks merely 
to protect the bank in paying out money to either of them. 
Apparently both Neill v. Royce and Holt v. Bayles considered 
the New York Moskowitz case as supporting the application 
of the conclusive presumption, but the headnote of the Mos-
kowitz case annotated at 66 A.L.R. 871 reads: 
"Independently of statute, a savings bank deposit 
made by one person to the credit of herself and an-
other 'payable to either or the survivor of them' and 
the delivery of the pass book to the latter would have 
been insufficient either to establish an intention to 
make a gift or to effectuate a delivery of the subject 
matter of a gift." 
In arriving at the anomalous conclusion that the alleged 
donee was relieved of the burden of showing a gift to her 
and that the expression contained in the bank deposit card was 
conclusive, Holt v. Bayles distinguishes the cases of Holman 
v. Deseret Savings Bank, Olson v. Scott, Boyle v. Dinsdale 
and Christensen v. Ogden State Bank, all cited supra, in that 
they "turned on the question of whether or not there was a 
gift inter vivos, not whether there had been the creation of 
a joint ownership with right of survivorship." Of this theory 
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imposed by some courts, the annotation in L.R.A. 1917C. 551 
states: 
"It is believed that such a theory rests upon a mis-
conception of the real nature of the question or contest. 
It must be remembered that the contest in the cases at 
hand is between the estate of the original owner and 
the survivor . . . in other words, property that ad-
mittedly belonged to one person at a former time is 
claimed by another who does not pretend to have 
parted with any valuable consideration therefor. If the 
contest were between the depositors ~nd the bank, it 
might be true that the depositors, even the one other 
than the original owner, could stand on the contractual 
relation created by the deposit in this form, or that 
the bank, having paid the fund to the one other than 
the original owner, might defend an action by the 
original owner on the ground that it had complied 
with its contract in such payment. But the real contest 
is not between the depositors and the bank-the bank 
is a mere stakeholder; the contest is in substance or 
effect between the depositors themselves. In such a 
case, either a gift or a trust is a condition precedent 
to any question arising under the tenancy created by 
such a deposit." 
At 7 Am. Jur., Banks, Sec. 426 (b) it is said: 
"The question of joint tenancy is also subsequent! y 
discussed; there are a number of statutes creating this 
relationship betwen the co-depositors, but as a general 
thing, and apart from statute, the better considered 
cases regarded such a relation as a secondary one that 
results from a gift or trust." 
In the absence of a statutory provision establishing the 
uu: rights of the depositors between themselves, it is generally 
~ held that questions presented as to the ownership of the fund 
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must be determined in the light of common law principles 
under the circumstances attending the deposit. In that deter-
mination, the intention of the depositor is a primary and con-
trolling factor. 48 A.L.R. 190; 66 A.L.R. 881; 103 A.L.R. 
1123; Kittredge v. Manning, 317 Mass. 689, 59 N.E. 2d 261; 
Pence v. Wessels, 320 Mich. 195, 30 N.W. 2d 834. 
The difficulty of concluding the intention of the depositor 
from the language of the deposit card, where there is no 
guiding statute, is amply demonstrated in the present case. 
Here we have a wide diversity of language on the various 
cards, even those signed on the same day apparently under the 
same circumstances. Some create an interest in Mrs. Demiris 
under the theory of the Holt case; the cards on the Continental 
Bank accounts create no interest under that law, and another, 
American Savings & Loan Association Trust Account, pur-
ports to create an interest in her estate after her death. If 
the language of the latter account card is to be strictly con-
strued without regard to the requirements of an inter vivos 
gift, the institution profits by the continuation of the deposit 
but both reason and the evidence indicate that such was not 
the intention of either Mr. Demiris or Mrs. Demiris on the 
day they signed it. 
The cards demonstrate the vanous vtews of the banks 
as to their obligations to their clients, the banks' desire to 
protect themselves in accordance with U.C.A. 1953, 7-3-45, 
and the skill or lack of skill of their attorneys, but they dem-
onstrate little of the intention of the parties entering the so-
called agreement. This is the danger of applying a conclusive 
presumption in the absence of a definitive statute. 
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The rule of Holt v. Bayles creates a conflict in the burdens 
of proof. The clear and convincing proof required in all other 
gift situations, regardless of whether the donee, having ob-
tained possession, is sued as defendant or brings suit against 
the estate, Lovett v. Continental Bank, supra, is effectively 
and completely destroyed where a counter conclusive presump-
tion (apparently a substantive rule of law) is applied in this 
area. A presumption might arise in the donee's favor upon 
the introduction of the joint account cards, but only if that 
presumption is made conclusive will the presumptions conflict 
under the Thayer and Wigmore view of presumptions. 
The donee primarily meets the burden of producing the 
joint account cards and the donor's estate must thence take 
on the burden of showing an intent other than that expressed 
in the cards. If it does so, and the donee fails to convincingly 
rebut this evidence, then the decision must be for the donor 
and against the donee . 
. "Presumptions are sometimes spoken of as 'con-
flicting'. But~ in the sense above examined, presump-
tions do not conflict. The evidentiary facts, free from 
any rule of law as to the duty of producing evidence, 
may tend to opposite inferences, which may be said 
to conflict. But the rule of law which prescribes this 
duty of production either is or is not at a given time 
upon a given party. If it is, and he removes it by pro-
ducing contrary evidence, then that presumption, as a 
rule of law, is satisfied and disappears; he may then 
by his evidence succeed in creating another presump-
tion which now puts the same duty upon the other 
party . . . " IX Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 2492, p. 
292. See also I d. Sec. 2491 ( 3) p. 290. 
Michigan, which has a statute creating a presumption 
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of a gift, has held that the presumption has no weight as 
evidence when challenged by rebutting testimony, National 
Bank of Detroit v. Schirmer, 303 Mich. 598, 6 N.W. 2d 908; 
Pence v. Wessels, 320 Mich. 195, 30 N.W. 2d 834. 
It is submitted that the state of the evidence in the present 
case, as discussed in Point IV, infra, is such as to reinvest 
Mrs. Demiris with the burden of showing by clear and con-
vincing evidence the gift of the money in the accounts, if the 
conclusiveness of the presumption of the Holt case is over-
ruled, as it is believed it should be. With the continuing 
burden of persuasion upon the defendant the decision should 
have been for appellants as to all the bank accounts and bonds. 
B. Even if the Holt Case is Followed, the Trial Court 
Erred in Applying a Conclusive Presumption to Funds 
Withdrawn from the Accounts Prior to the Death of 
the True Owner. 
Nirs. Demiris withdrew all of the money in all of the 
accounts, with the exception of the American Savings & Loan 
trust account which she could not obtain, and cashed all of 
the U. S. Savings Bonds after her husband had been hospital-
ized as incompetent, but before his death. Even those states 
having statutory authority for applying a conclusive presump· 
tion apply that presumption only to the survivorship feature 
of the accounts, Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N.Y. 380, supra, 
and not to money withdrawn during the lifetime of the true 
owner. As is stated in 161 A.L.R. 86: 
"It may be noted that where the act of one in open· 
ing with his own funds a bank account in the names 
of himself and another, with formal authority in either 
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to draw, does not under the particular circumstances 
constitute a gift of any interest, the act of such other 
in withdrawing all of the money in the lifetime of 
both parties not only does not destroy the rights of 
the owner, but under the New York, and similar 
statutes, the drawer by such act will be prevented from 
acquiring title as survivor. Under such statutes the 
withdrawal renders proof of the true ownership com-
petent notwithstanding the death of the owner, which 
proof, had the money been left in the account, would 
have been excluded by reason of the statutory presump-
tion of joint ownership becoming conclusive on such 
death." 
Under the theory of almost all of the cases reported in that 
annotation, beginning at page 66, "the question whether one 
of the parties to a joint account, empowered, as to the bank, 
to withdraw all the money, may rightfully do so as to the 
other party, and whether, having made a total withdrawal, 
he may apply the money to his personal use without liability 
to the other, is, ordinarily, under the prevailing doctrine, 
the mere question whether the withdrawer is the true owner 
... "p. 75. 
Thus, the evidence in the present case should have been 
; considered in its entirety, giving the form of the cards only 
r;: that weight due it in all the circumstances of the case. 
r~ 
I~ POINT IV 
IF A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION IS CREATED BY 
ANY DEPOSIT CARDS THAT DECEASED INTENDED 
n· TO MAKE A GIFT TO DEFENDANT PLAINTIFFS OVER-
:~ CAME SUCH PRESUMPTION BY CLEAR AND CON-
nf VINCING EVIDENCE. 
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Since aU of the evidence, including that of defendant, 
shows that the deceased had three concerns for the money 
which he had accumulated over the years, ( 1) that his brothers 
and sister receive according to the will, ( 2) that Mrs. Demiris' 
family get none of . it, and ( 3) that if he became too ill to 
manage his affairs that his bills would be paid, the presumption 
of a gift to Mrs. Demiris of the money destined to pay out his 
bequests and administer his estate without cost to his specific 
legatees is at odds with his oft-expressed intent. It is to be 
noted that Mrs. Demiris, as residuary legatee and insurance 
beneficiary, is well provided for even if the terms of the will 
are enforced. 
1. A gift by joint account is contrary to his numerous wills. 
He well knew how to handle the disposition of his money in 
the event of his death and sought to do so, despite Mrs. 
Demir is' interference ( T -105, 109, 15 5) . 
2. Mrs. Demiris was not the natural reap1ent of his 
bounty. Although Mr. Demiris was aware of a duty owing to 
his wife and sought to discharge it by leaving her the greater 
portion of his estate, he felt no typical marital affection for 
her and sought to pay her to divorce him (T-106, 107, 154). 
They quarrelled frequently ( T -149, 177, 289). He feared her 
(T-144). They spent almost half of their married life apart. 
3. Mrs. Demiris did not use any of the money in the joint 
accounts until she was aware of the facts of his impending 
, death, although she complained that he was stingy (T-104) 
and wanted money to go back to Greece (T-75). Nor did she 
cash the bonds until December, 1956, and January, 1957, 
(T-40) (Ex. P-22). 
54 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
:s 
4. Mrs. Demiris showed her guilty knowledge that no 
gift was intended by withdrawing all the money in their joint 
names immediately after his being hospitalized in an incompe-
tent state (Ex. P-10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 22). 
5. Mrs. Demiris again demonstrated guilty knowledge by 
stating in her deposition that the bonds had been cashed 
prior to December, 1956, when in fact she herself cashed them 
after that time (T-41) (Ex. P-42). 
6. J\1r. Demir is stated that his intent was to arrange 
matters so that Mrs. Demiris would be able to receive and 
cash the checks from the payments on the note in case of his 
illness (T-258). 
7. The testimony of defendant's witness, Mrs. Demas, 
indicates that the reason for the December 5 changes in the 
accounts was to provide a means whereby Mrs. Demiris could 
take care of Mr. Demiris if he was ill, (T-333) and even 
Mrs. Tsimpoukis only testified that one of the two had stated 
"that he had changed the books" (T-293). 
8. Mrs. Demiris inquired of a disinterested witness how 
she could withdraw money from the bank accounts just prior 
to the time the last accounts were made joint on December 
5 (T-56). 
9. Mrs. Demiris harrassed the deceased by telling him 
nti she would get all of his money when he was dead regardless 
~ of his desires (T. 162). 
T 
~ 10. Regardless of whether Mr. Demiris was incompetent 
on December 5 or not, he was obviously a sick man, for he 
died on January 23. After a lifetime of protecting his money 
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from his wife the most reasonable conclusion is that the 
' 
change at that date was made for business convenience. 
Additionally, it appears that there was no inter vivos 
gift as to the first four joint accounts, including the checking 
account at Walker Bank, which all were established some 
time prior to December 5, 1956, and which totaled $34,641.99 
(Ex. P-10, P-12, P-15, Pretrial Order 3, par. f), for Mrs. 
Demiris stated that she had no knowledge as to their exist-
ence (T-34). Although the contract with the bank may be 
sufficient substitute for the formalities of a gift in ordinary 
circumstances, the act of the alleged donor in preventing 
knowledge by the donee that she had the power to withdraw 
the funds would negative a presumption that he intended 
an immediate! y effective gift. The most that could be said 
of his intention under such circumstances was that he intended 
a gift to take effect upon his death, which gift would be void 
as violative of the Statute of Wills. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
DEPOSIT CARDS ON THE TWO CONTINENTAL BANK 
ACCOUNTS GRANTED ANY INTEREST THEREIN TO 
THE DEFENDANT. 
The deposit cards of the two Continental Bank accounts 
evidence no donative intent whatsoever, and fall within the 
exception of Greener v. Greener, supra. 
The Continental Bank cards create no survivorship in· 
terest and provide only that the bank has discharged its 
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obligation by paying to either of the depositors. In Greener 
v. Greener, supra, it is said: "If there is no agreement between 
the parties which has been reduced to writing, the only docu-
mentary evidence being the form of the deposit (e.g. 'in 
account with A or B' with no provision concerning survivor-
ship), the intent of the owner in converting the account to 
a joint one must be shown by extrinsic evidence as there is no 
presumption that a 'joint tenancy' or gift was intended." 
The entire language of the two cards signed by Mr. and 
Mrs. Demiris with the Continental Bank, Ex. P-12 and P-13, 
reads merely: 
"Below find duly authorized signatures, either of 
which you will recognize in payment of funds from 
this account, or the transaction of other business in 
connection with the account. 
"The sums deposited to this account are, and those 
sums hereafter to be deposited shall be payable to either 
of us or to the survivor of us; and we hereby agree 
that the receipt of either of us shall be a full acquaint-
ance and discharge to The Continental Bank and Trust 
Company, Salt Lake City, therefor. Each of the under-
signed does hereby appoint the other as his or her 
lawful attorney to endorse in his or her name any 
checks, darfts or other negotiable instruments payable 
to him or her and to deposit the same in the joint 
account of the undersigned in The Continental Bank 
and Trust Company, Salt Lake City." 
Without the procedural advantage of a presumption in 
her favor, Mrs. Demiris has failed to prove anything other 
than the limited agency granted by the bank deposit card. By 
her own testimony, she laid no claim to the money other than 
by gift from her husband and all of the evidence introduced, 
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including the defendant's, is consistent with the vtew that 
Mr. Demiris gave her the power to draw upon the accounts 
containing money which he had disposed of by will for 
business convenience only. Therefore, the trial court erred in 
failing to award these two accounts to the deceased's estate. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE 
THAT IF A JOINT TENANCY WAS CREATED IN ANY 
OF THE ACCOUNTS AND IN THE U. S. SAVINGS 
BONDS, THAT SUCH JOINT TENANCY WAS TERMI-
NATED BY THE WITHDRAWAL BY DEFENDANT OF 
THE ENTIRE AMOUNTS IN THE ACCOUNTS AND THE 
CASHING OF THE BONDS DURING THE LIFETIME 
OF HER HUSBAND. 
A. No Joint Tenancy Was Created. 
A further reconciliation of the Utah cases is suggested 
in the cases themselves. In Columbia Trust Co. v. Anglum, 
63 Utah 353, 255 P. 1089, where the parties opened and 
contributed to the account, the prior gift cases were dis-
tinguished: "In each of those cases the question determined 
by the court was whether there was a gift inter vivos, not 
whether there had been the creation of a joint ownership 
with right of survivorship." In First Security Bank v. Burgi, 
122 Utah 445, 251 P. 2d 297, it is stated, "Likewise it is true 
that the fact that all the funds are contributed by one of the 
parties will not prevent the creation of a joint tenancy in the 
account if all of the essentials for the creation of such estate 
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exist/' (Emphasis ours). This reasoning suggests the neces-
sity of the presence of the four unities, interest, title, time 
and possession, which from the recited evidence are not present 
in this case. 
In 7 Am. Jur., Banks, sec. 435, p. 307, the necessity for 
the existence of the unities is discussed and it is pointed out 
that absent a modifying statute, it is practically impossible 
to achieve the four unities in a bank account originally owned 
by one of the depositors. "This rule as to unities has been 
modified by statute in some jurisdictions; these statutes, though, 
do not in general abolish all the unities required." 
B. The Joint Estate Was Destroyed by the Withdrawal 
of More Than One-Half of the Funds During the 
Lifetime of Both of the Joint Tenants. 
While Mr. Demiris was alive, there existed a presumption 
that he retained at least one-half ownership in all of the 
accounts and bonds, Greener v. Greener, supra. Therefore, 
upon the destruction of the unities of ownership, interest, 
title, and time, by the severance by Mrs. Demiris, the joint 
estate was extinguished, Tracy-Collins Trust Co. v. Goeltz, 5 
Utah 2d 350, 301 P. 2d 1086, and Mrs. Demiris cannot claim 
survivorship rights even though it be held that an inter vivos 
gift was made. This rule has been applied to joint bank 
accounts in the cases of Steinmetz v Steinmetz, 130 N.J. Eq. 
176, 21 A. 2d 743; and other New Jersey and Pennsylvania 
cases cited in 161 A.L.R. 80. 
The Steinmetz case arose under facts almost identical 
to the present case .. The third and fourth paragraphs of the 
syllabus by the court read: 
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'' 3. During the life of the husban~ and _wife the 
moneys on deposit in such accounts pnma faoe belong 
to them equally. The wife's withdrawal _of all n:oneys 
in the accounts while the husband was altve and msane 
destroyed the joint tenancy so far as her interest was 
concerned, including her right to have the joint funds 
as survivor. 
"4. By taking absolute possession of the entire joint 
funds the wife became a tenant in common of the 
funds to the extent of her one-half interest. She held 
the half share of her husband cotenant as agent or 
trustee for him, which share her husband's adminis-
trator is entitled to recover from her." 
This ruling was made upon cards definitely creating a 
joint tenancy, unlike the Continental Bank cards, and reading: 
"This account is opened by us and intended to create 
a joint estate to us as joint tenants and not as tenants 
. " 1n common. 
and a second card reading: 
"This account and all moneys to be credited to it 
belong to us as joint tenants and will be the absolute 
property of the survivor of us; either and the survivor 
to draw." 
No evidence was offered to show the purpose or intent of 
the parties in opening the accounts. 
'' . . . But the wife took advantage of her husband's 
disability and seized the entire joint funds in an in-
equitable attempt to deprive him of all interest and 
rights therein. Had he not then been under disability 
and had he brought suit against his wife for account-
ing for his share of their joint funds, there can be 
110 doubt that 011 the facts as disclosed in this case 
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~ 
he would have been adjudged to have an interest in 
the joint funds. 
" ... By Mrs. Steinmetz's act, she severed the unity 
of interest and possession which had theretofore existed 
between her husband and herself and she thereby 
destroyed the joint tenancy so far as her interest was 
concerned, including her right to have the joint funds 
as survivor.'' 
Thus it was decreed in the Steinmetz case that Mrs. 
Steinmetz pay over to her husband's administrator one-half 
of the money in the joint accounts. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence demonstrates 
that James Demiris was incompetent at the time he pur-
portedly made transfers of his property which he had previously 
willed to the intervenors. The evidence further shows that 
James Demiris during the latter days of his life, being ill 
and dependent, was under the influence of a domineering wife 
who abused the confidential relationship between them and 
obtained an unfair advantage over him. Since this is an equity 
case, the Court is not bound by the findings of the trial court 
and may examine anew the evidence in regard to these points. 
However, even should the Court determine the issues 
~- of incompetency or undue influence in Appellants' favor, there 
rbi still remains to be determined the effect of making the accounts 
~ joint and the effect of withdrawal of the funds by one joint 
~ depositor in disparagement of the rights of the other joint 
ec ~ depositor who was the true owner, because some of the accounts 
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existed as joint accounts prior to December 5, 1956; and all 
of the accounts were withdrawn by the defendant prior to 
Jim Demiris's death. 
This marriage, arranged by mutual friends, did not, un-
fortunately produce the affection, understanding, and com-
panionship that had been sought. This was a barren, unhappy 
marriage, filled with dissension and frustration. The actions 
and conduct of the defendant in acquiring most of the de-
ceased's estate while he was in a state of incompetency clearly 
thwarted his desires, and to sanction this conduct would create 
a most unjust and shocking result. 
Jim Demiris provided very adequately for his wife upon 
his death under the terms of his Last Will and Testament. 
The specific bequest of $10,000.00 to his four brothers and 
one sister still left approximately $50,000.00 to go to his wife, 
in addition to a $10,000.00 insurance policy on which she was 
the beneficiary. This appeal seeks only to achieve the results 
which Jim Demiris proposed in his Will and repeatedly ex-
pressed throughout his life. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID K. W A TKISS 
721 Cont'l Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
NATHAN J. FULLMER 
619 Cont'l Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
D. F. WILKINS 
305 Newhouse Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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